Q_1. (The Problem) Description of the problem reflects a solid understanding of the differences between the current and desired environments and what is preventing the current environment from becoming the desired environment. Justification is logical and based on the provided background material.

Q_2. (Center of Gravity) Clearly and concisely meets all of the criteria for B-level work plus provides a strong rationale by demonstrating the linkage of the adversary’s objective and the linkages between the CoG’s CCs, CRs and CVs. Provides specific examples from background material or documents to support the selection

Q_3a. (Operational Approach Narrative) The narrative reflects a solid understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing a broad approach for achieving the desired end state. The narrative is a logical conclusion of previous responses and clearly articulates how the Allies will transition the current environment to the desired environment.

Q_3b. (Operational Approach) The graphic is explained by the narrative. Planners could clearly derive initial intent and begin mission analysis based upon this product.

Q_4. (Conditions/Military End State) Selects correct answer

Q_5. (CoG) Demonstrates strong understanding of the linkage of the objective, the CC required to achieve that objective and identifies the entity that possesses that CC as the COG and its critical requirements. Provides specific examples from background material or TORCH documents to support the selection.

Q_6. (Direct or Indirect Approach) Selects correct answer or an answer that correctly relates to the CoG the student had selected in Q2

Q_7.C (Decisive Points (DP) clearly understands the concept. Identifies and supports with well-developed discussion three joint-force oriented DPs. Links DP to critical factors. Comprehensively explains the advantage provided to the Allied operation.

Q_8. (Culmination) Clearly understands the concept. Identifies and supports three joint-force-oriented culminating points. Provides clear and organized critique of the plan’s effectiveness in addressing culmination.

——————————————————————————-
Part 1

General Instructions

1. The Operational Art and Design will test your critical reasoning skills and your comprehension of the concept contained in operational design and the elements of operational design in the context of campaign and major operation planning, using historical planning documents. It covers material contained in Fundamentals of Joint Doctrine, and Operational Art and Design and Elements of Operational Design.

2. *There are (8) requirements, some with multiple parts.
*Carefully read Parts (2) and (3) contained in this read ahead before responding to questions (1~8 with multiple parts), critical thinking is required.
* Justify/Explain your answer (Process is important)
*You will be evaluated on clarity and conciseness.
*Typing: Times New Roman, 12 font, Double-Spaced, 1inch margins.
*Name and date on (every) page
*Clearly identify the requirement and question you are addressing:
Example:
Question 1. Response xxxxxxxx
Question 2. Response xxxxxxxx
*DO NOT do additional research….use the information provided to find or deduce your responses.
*Think operationally (campaign and operational levels)—avoid tactical details.
*Operation X, is a major operation that can be understood in the context of the overarching Mediterranean/North African Campaign.
*There are (2) sections here in this content.
*Section A – Mainly focused on operational design in the context of the North Africa campaign.
Section B – Mainly focused on selected elements of operational design in the context of Operation X.
l BEFORE you begin formulating answers:
*Ask yourself am I thinking at the operational (not tactical) level? Is the question scoped at the campaign or major operational level? This will assist you in formulating your answers.
*Read the information in Parts 2 and 3 and then reread the information, making notes of pertinent information. Repeat this multiple times if necessary, before attempting to formulate answers.
* Questions 1~8
(Must be answered in Active Voice, clear & concise, so even an eighth grader would understand the answers, need to FIRST draft a sketch/map of the locations to visualize and answer the ?’s, the map along with Joint Publication 5-0 (JP 5-0) (Search GOOGLE for JP 5-0), will assist in formulating and answering some of the questions)
l Operation X, defines good writing as “understandable in a single, rapid reading and generally free of errors in grammar, mechanics, and usage.”
*Critical Capabilities are always “VERB’s”.
* Critical Requirements are always “NOUN’s”
*Center of Gravity Analysis are linked to OBJECTIVES”.
*Center of Gravity: (ONLY A Example in the Steps below)
Step 1: ID the GOAL.
Step 2: ID Critical Capabilities or ID Critical Requirements..
Possible CC’s: Exercise diplomacy, Attack military forces, buy independence, refuse to pay taxes, influence world opinion.
Possible CR’s: militia soldiers, military leadership, military forces, supplies, training, equipment, allied support.
*End, Ways, Means, method for COG Identification and Analysis
1) ID the Goal
2) ID the primary Way
3) List the Means/Resources
4) Determine Center of Gravity by selecting from the list the means with the capability to perform the way.
Ways (Verbs) = Critical Capability
Means with the Critical Capability = Center of Gravity
List resources required to execute the way. The means with the inherent capability to perform the way (Critical Capability) is the Center of Gravity. All other means are critical requirements. (COG JP 5-0)
Critical Vulnerabilities (GOOGLE SEARCH : Joint Publication 5-0)
*Culmination- always caused by some lack of resources. Look at OBJECTIVES, how could I be stopped without being defeated. (Risks)
*Operational Approach: Lines of Effort, Conditions, = ENDSTATE.
* Lines of Effort JP 5-0, page 3-29
*Lines of Operation, JP 5-0, Figure III-13, page 3-27.
*BASE–FORCE–ENEMY = LINES OF OPERATION.
*Decisive Point: example; Control air-space over the objective, the degree of speed, marked advantage.
*Think Conceptually, enemy & friendly can share or have the same decisive Points (DP)
* OBJECTIVE = GOAL
*COG is always linked to the to an OBJECTIVE.
*ONLY (1) COG (Ideally)
* Q_8: I more than likely in the sketch and “Enclosure C” Letter from GEN Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 23 AUG 1942.
*Elements of Op Design: JP 5-0, August 2011 Chapter 3, section B, page III-18 to III-46. (Total 29 pages)
*From Op Art to Op Plans : Chapter III of JP 5-0.
———————————————————————————————
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS

1. Part 2 contains contextual background information on the situation relevant to the M/NATO Theater and the North African campaign and puts Operation X in context. Part 3 contains the outline plan prepared by planners of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Norfolk Group, (which was equivalent to Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters) for Operation X (2nd Revision), submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the 1942 invasion of North Africa. Within the plan are documents from the Combined Chiefs and the Allied Expeditionary Force Commander-in-Chief that clarify thought and intent. These are the actual documents from the archives reprinted only for legibility (errors in the original were not corrected). Understanding of both Parts 2 and 3 is required to successfully complete this exam as Part 2 provides context to Part 3. The historical documents in Part 3 were chosen for two reasons. First, the language and terminology used does not specifically give away or spell out the answers, although the information required to answer the questions is contained in the plan. This requires you to use critical reasoning combined with a full understanding of the concepts of operational art and operational design to determine your answers. Second, since this is the first time many of you are being asked to demonstrate your understanding of these concepts a relatively straightforward conventional operation was selected.
———————————————————————————————————

2. Operation X was a major operation conducted in an Area of Operations within the Mediterranean/North African Theater of Operations (M/NATO) as part of a larger North African campaign. At the time of planning there were discussions on other major operations involving the British 8th Army in Egypt as part of a North African campaign.

The M/NATO was important to both the Axis and Allies for the three reasons: Effective control of the area provided or denied access to Persian Gulf oil. It exposed or secured the “soft underbelly” of Europe. It also shortened or lengthened sea lines of communication (SLOC) to the Soviet Union and British India. Additionally for the Allies it provided an opportunity to open the “Second Front” against the Axis and relieve pressure on the Soviet Union. (US and British planners initially disagreed on the desirability of operations in M/NATO, but regardless it still provided opportunity.) North Africa began as an Italian theater that Germany initially considered a sideshow when compared to operations in Russia. However, early in 1941, Hitler was forced to bolster his Italian ally’s operations against the British Eighth Army in Egypt by providing Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel’s Africa Corps. With the German failure to defeat USSR in 1941, Hitler began to retool his strategy for a longer protracted war. Hitler appointed Albert Speer to expand war related industrial production. It was a heavily resource driven strategy and the Persian Gulf area with its oil became increasingly important and the Mediterranean and North Africa was the route to it The spring 1942 offensive in Russia was directed at the Caucasus region to gain oil resources required for a longer war effort. In support of this “resource strategy” Axis forces in North Africa wanted to cut the Suez Canal and gain access to and deny British access to Persian Gulf oil. Should this happen it would weaken the Allies while strengthening the Axis. It was the mission of the British Eighth Army in Egypt to secure the Suez Canal and Axis access to the oil. Note that at the strategic level Britain, as an island nation, was heavily dependent on the import of oil and other raw materials thus maintaining open SLOCs was of critical importance. Open SLOCs through the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal shortened access to oil, the Soviet Union and British India by a factor of eight. The British Eighth Army and Axis forces (later known as Panzerarmee Africa) battled each other in the Libyan Desert throughout 1941 and 1942. Both sides would attack and push forward until its momentum and supplies were exhausted (operational reach and culmination) and then be compelled to return to its base to avoid annihilation. This back and forth became known as the Gazala Gallop. This was caused almost exclusively by logistics and, like a piece of elastic the line of supply of both armies could be stretched only about 300 to 400 miles from its principal base-Tripoli for the Axis forces and Alexandria for the British. The direct approach was not working and the Allies had to find another approach to defeating the Axis forces in North Africa so they could secure the M/NATO. Since both sides were separated from their homeland base of support by considerable distances over long stretches of water, each could have had their elastic snapped if the SLOCs were threatened (Critical Vulnerability). The British were required to resupply their army in Egypt by steaming all the way around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope and through the Suez Canal due to the effectively closing the Mediterranean SLOCs. While the eastern Mediterranean was dominated primarily by the Axis, between the Sicilian straits and Crete the British held the island of Malta. This was a British base for aircraft, destroyers, and submarines which severely curtailed the flow of supplies and reinforcements from Italy to Tripoli, forcing the Axis to select less threatening air lines of communication (ALOC) and SLOCs further west in Tunisia. The Axis, however, operating from Sicily and Italy, had a substantial air capability, particularly in the central Mediterranean. Thus, even though Tripoli was the main operating base for the Axis forces, by trans-loading further west in Tunis and bringing reinforcements and resupply through Tunisia they shortened their exposure time to British attacks from Malta. Since the fall of France (June 1940) brought the Vichy French government into collaboration with the Nazis, there was no need for the Axis to station forces in the French Northwest Africa—French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. In effect the Vichy French secured the Axis flank/rear. So at the time of planning for Operation X all of North Africa and the southern Mediterranean, minus most of Egypt, were under Axis control, either directly by German/Italian forces or indirectly through Vichy French forces. The only major concentrations of non-French, Axis forces were located in/near Tripoli in Libya or in the Western Desert between Egypt and Libya. (NOTE: France was not formally part of the Axis alliance.) The German-French armistice allowed for the military provision of the French colonial empire overseas, North Africa included. The Vichy French forces purpose was to keep internal order and to defend French territories from Allied assault. French forces remained under the overall direction of the German armed forces. The French Army in North Africa consisted of 14 divisions with 55,000 troops in Morocco and another 50,000 in Algeria. If the French forces in North Africa should act as a unit and oppose the invasion, attaining Operation X objectives could be at serious risk. The loyalty of the French force’s leadership to Vichy France and the terms of the armistice with Germany were questionable and the unity or cooperation between French Army, Navy, and Air Force all depended on the decisions and degree of the loyalty of the senior leadership of their respective services. Because of questionable loyalty, the command and control and synchronization of Vichy forces would be problematic.
**Two other factors relating to Northwest Africa that affected Operation X were:
(1) The narrow strip of northern Morocco opposite the Gibraltar peninsula was a Spanish protectorate. Despite being fascist, Franco’s Spain was neutral, making Spanish Morocco neutral as well. So, unless Spain denounced its neutrality and joined the Axis, or the Axis violated its neutrality, Axis troops were prevented from being stationed there.
(2) This fact, if it remained unchanged, was an advantage for the Allies, since the British also occupied the peninsula of Gibraltar that controlled the western entrance to the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar.
The final impetus for the Operation X operation was the British Eighth Army’s defeat in a spectacular tank battle with German forces at Knightsbridge in Libya, on 13 June 1942, and the subsequent fall of Tobruk in eastern Libya on 21 June, followed by the rapid advance of Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel’s Panzerarmee Africa toward Alexandria and the Suez Canal.
3. Part 3 Supporting Documents
Enclosed are Combined Chiefs of Staff, Operation X Notes by the Secretaries dated 25 August with three (3) enclosures.

4. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
OPERATION X Notes by the Secretaries
Enclosures:
A. Directive for Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force which replaced General Eisenhower’s covering letter).
B. Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Norfolk Group, Outline Plan, Operation “X” (General Eisenhower’s 2nd revised outline plan).
C. Copy of Letter from General Eisenhower addressed to Combined Chiefs of Staff dated 23rd August 1942.
————————————————————————————————————–

5. Notes by the Secretaries dated 25 August 1942.

ENCLOSURE A
DIRECTIVE FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
(As approved C.C.S. 36th Meeting on 13 August, 1942)
The president and the Prime Minister have agreed that combined military operations be directed against Africa, as early as practicable, with a view to gaining, in conjunction with Allied Forces in the Middle East, complete control of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea.
A. Command.
(1) You are appointed Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, to undertake the above mentioned operation.
(2) You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and you will receive from that body all directives for the operation. Whenever feasible and appropriate, matters pertaining to end affecting the operation with which you are charged will be referred to you for advance consideration and recommendations, prior to formal promulgation.
(3) In the interests of speedy preparation of plans, you are authorized to communicate direct with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff or the British Chiefs of Staff.
B. Concept of Operations.
The operations should be conducted with a view to accomplishing as rapidly as possible the following initial, intermediate and ultimate objectives:
(1) Establishment of firm and mutually supported lodgments in the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area on the north coast, and in the Casablanca area on the northwest coast, in order that appropriate bases for continued and intensified air, ground and sea operations will be readily available.
(2) Vigorous and rapid exploitation from lodgments obtained in order to acquire complete control of the entire area, including French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (it will be necessary to be prepared to take similar action in Spanish Morocco in the event of hostile action by the Spaniards), to facilitate effective air and ground operations against the enemy, and to create favourable conditions for extension of offensive operations to the east through Libya against the rear of Forces in the Western Desert.
(3) Complete annihilation of Axis forces now opposing the British forces in the Western Desert and intensification of air and sea operations against the Axis on the European continent.
C. Preparation of Outline Plan and Estimate of Resources.
In consonance with the a above, you are to submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible your outline plan, together with an estimate of the resources required to implement it. Subsequent to approval of your basic outline plan, a more detailed directive will be issued.
Washington, D.C.
13th August, 1942
(Editor’s Note: The Western Desert is in western Egypt and eastern Libya.)

————————————————————————————————————–

ENCLOSURE B
HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
NORFOLK GROUP
OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION “X”
21 August 1942.
1. This outline plan was prepared jointly by a British-American group of planners, under the direction of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army. It is designed to initiate and give direction to more detailed planning.
2. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE: A combined land, sea and air assault against the Mediter-ranean Coast of Algeria, with a view to the earliest possible occupation of TUNISIA, and the establishment in FRENCH MOROCCO of a striking force which , can control the STRAITS of GIBRALTAR, by moving rapidly, if necessary, into SPAN-ISH MOROCCO.
3. DATE OF ASSAULT: (Tentative…..) 15th October, 1942, D.1 (equivalent to U.S. “D” Day).
Practically every consideration of strategy and policy dictates that this operation be initiated at the earliest possible date, the earlier the better. With this in mind, every aspect of the problem has been investigated, with a view to launching the attack on October 15.
4. ASSAULT PHASE: Simultaneous assaults at ORAN, ALGIERS, and BONE.
a. ORAN—Two pre-dawn landings, each by a force of approximately one Regi-
Mental Combat Team (British equivalent, one Brigade Group), one in the Vicinity of GULF of ARZEU (20 miles EAST of ORAN) and one at the BAY DES ANDALOUSES.
Aggregate Assault Force: Four Regimental Combat Teams, three of which are Assault Loaded, and one composite light armored force, Assault Loaded.
Objective: To secure the Port of ORAN and the nearby airdromes of LA SENIA and TAFAROUI.
Proposed Composition Assault Forces: One amphibiously trained U.S. infantry division, plus one Regimental Combat Team and one composite light armored force of about one Regiment, together with auxiliary troops and including part of the ground echelons required for the U.S. Operation X, Air force. Three Infantry Regiments and the armored Regiment to be Combat Loaded.
b. ALGIERS—Three pre-dawn landings, each by one Regimental Combat Team, one near SIDI PERRUCH (15 miles WEST of ALGIERS) and one near AIN TAYA(11 miles EAST of ALGIERS).
Aggregate Assault Force: Four Regimental Combat Teams, three of which are Assault Loaded.
Objective: To secure the Port of ALGIERS and the airdromes at MAISON BLANCHE and HUSSEIN DEY.
Proposed Composition Assault Forces: One British Division, with one U.S. Regimental Combat Team, attached (from 34th U.S. Division) under command of C.G. 78th Division (British). A senior American representative of the Allied C. in C. will accompany this force to treat with any French authorities who may be willing to collaborate.

c. BONE—A pre-dawn landing in the vicinity of CAPE DE GARDE, NORTH of the city, by approximately one Regimental Combat Team.
Aggregate Assault Force: One U.S. “Ranger” battalion with the remainder of the force British. The balance of the force will arrive in a second convoy on D.2.
Objective: To secure the Port of BONE and the airdrome near DOZZERVILLE (6 1/2 miles SOUTH of BONE).
5. BUILD-UP PHASE: On the assumption that ORAN and ALGIERS will have been captured by the end of D.3, the movement of supporting and follow-up troops into these Ports and BONE should be timed for D.4.
a. ALGIERS and EASTWARD: To consolidate our position, and to build up a force which can prevent an enemy landing in TUNISIA or Westward, a total of six divisions (2 armored and 4 infantry) will be required, including the landing forces.
The striking force in TUNISIA will be built up by land, sea, and possibly air movement eastward from ALGIERS and BONE, with advance elements stating as quickly as possible.
b. ORAN and WESTWARD: to consolidate our position in ORAN and FRENCH MOROCCO, and to build up striking forces which could occupy SPANISH MOROCCO if required, a total of seven divisions (2 armored and 5 infantry) will be required, including the landing forces.
The second convoy will land air forces and an armored division to strike west, open up communications through MOROCCO and seize CASABLANCA from the rear, Should French resistance cease while this convoy is in transit, it might however be diverted into CASABLANCA. Thereafter, the build-up would continue through both Ports.
The ultimate dispositions envisaged are:
One Division to garrison each of CASABLANCA and ORAN areas.
One Division to keep open communications between CASABLANCA and ORAN.
One Division to form a striking force on the South-East border of SPANISH MOROCCO.
c. Time Factors: After Assault units have been brought up to normal scale of transport and equipment, the probable rate of build-up will be:
Through ALGIERS……………1 1/2 Div. per month
BONE………………………………2/3 Div. per month
ORAN……………………………..1 Div. per month
CASABLANCA…………………1 Div. per month
Providing escorts are available to bring in two convoys per month. This rate
of flow must be maintained until at least the thirteen divisions contemplated
are in the theater.
6. ALLOCATION OF TASKS:
a. AMERICAN: The Assault at ORAN, the occupation of the ORAN area and of FRENCH MOROCCO, the establishment and maintenance of communications between ORAN and CASABLANCA and the build-up of a striking force opposite SPANISH MOROCCO.
b. BRITISH: The Assaults at ALGIERS and BONE, the occupation of ALGERIA (except the ORAN area) and TUNISIA. As, however, it has been deemed expedient for political reasons that all Assaults should be led by U.S. Combat Team allotted to the British Force for ALGIERS and the U.S. Ranger battalion, allotted to the British Force for BONE, will land first.
7. ULTIMATE TROOP SASIS: As a matter of policy, it is necessary to bear in mind the British manpower situation and its relocation to troop availability. In addition to this factor there is the vital necessity for economy in the use of shipping.
Since a strong force must be maintained in GREAT BRITAIN for the defense of that island, as well as to furnish troops for other theaters, it is apparent that, after a certain point has been reached, each British division sent to the new NONTH AFRICAN front must be replaces by an equivalent American Unit.
The urgent need for utilizing, in the stages of the operation, those troops which are most available, requires that some British divisions be employed. However, American forces should be used as far as practicable in the build-up phase. Of the estimated 13 Divisions required for the entire operation it is considered that approximately 9 should be American and 4 British with a corresponding proportion of service units.
8. AVIATION: Aviation will provide air cover and support for the initial Assault, protection of bases and communications, and support for the subsequent land operations.
Assaults at ORAN and ALGIERS will be supported by carrier-based aviation until airdromes for land-based aviation have been secured.
As soon as airdromes ashore can be secured and stocked, aircraft will be flown to them. Fighters for the relief of the carrier-based fighters will be flown in from GIBRALTAR. Bombers will be flown from the UNITED KINGDOM after the bases have been secured. A reserve of long-range U.S. fighters will be established in the UNITED KINGDOM as emergency relief of the carrier-based fighters, in the event that GIBRALTAR is rendered untenable.
For the ultimate-up of a striking force, bomber aircraft will be flown the UNITED KINGDOM and from the UNITED STATES via the UNITED KINGDOM or WEST AFRICA.
The requirements after support are so critical to the success of the operation that the provision of the necessary air forces must be given the highest priority. Details of the Air Plan are contained in the Air Annex.
9. NAVAL: The mission of the Naval forces will be:
a. To safeguard the overseas movements.
b. To support and land the military forces at their respective objectives.
c. To maintain the sea lines of communications. To accomplish the above it will be necessary to provide forces for the following tasks.
(1) Fleet covering forces against surface attacks in the ATLANTIC.
(2) Antisubmarine protection to each group of Assault shipping and to each subsequent convoy.
(3) Close Naval support for the landings, to include bombardment, A.A. protection and mine sweeping.
(4) Air cover to the assaults (except that at BONE) and to Naval surface forces and shipping, until shore-based aircraft are established on captured airdromes.
(5) A covering force in the Mediterranean to guard against Axis and Vichy French Forces.
(6) Naval base staffs for the operation of captured ports and maintenance of underwater defenses and local patrols.
(7) Naval reconnaissance, in conjunction with Air Forces when necessary.
(8) A Naval force, based on MEDITERRANEAN Ports, for offensive action during the build-up phase and during the forward movement into TUNISIA. “Operation X” is conceived as essentially an amphibious operation, in which the eastward advance along the MEDITERRANEAN will be possible only through the employment of effective Naval craft for the protection of ports, convoys, landing craft and beaches, as well as counteraction to prevent interference with land movements along the coast by hostile Naval forces.

ANNEXES
I. Operation X, Air Outline Plan (Omitted).
II. Operation “X”, Naval Outline Plan.
III. Of Outline Plan, Operation “X”, Eastern Task Force, Build-up and Operations Subsequent to Assault.
IV. To Outline Plan, Operation “X”, Outline Plan Western Task force.

————————————————————————————————————–

ENCLOSURE B
ANNEX III
OF OUTLINE PLAN, OPERATION “X”
EASTERN TASK FORCE
BUILD-UP AND OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO ASSAULT

Notes by the Secretaries dated 25 August 1942
1. POSSIBLE RATE OF REINFORCEMENT
The port and carrying facilities allow the discharge every two weeks of two brigades at Algiers and one at Bone, equivalent to a buildup of 1 1/2 divisions peer month Algiers and 2/3rd division at Bone. These estimates include allowance for Corps, Army and L of C Tps but do not cater for operations taking place at the end of long L of C such as those between Algiers and Bone—400 miles, and Bone and Tunis—200 miles. When the effect of operations on these long L of C has been considered and personnel and equipment requirements of the Royal Navy and R.A.F. have been met, it is estimated that the operational availability of formations will be lower than the possible rate of build up through the ports. Exact figures cannot be provided until full details have been worked out. The final build up at and to the east of Bone cannot be given as it will depend upon the future development of that port and the air cover afforded by the R.A.F.
2. OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE ASSAULT
a. Algiers. It is expected that Algiers and the aerodromes at Maison Blanche and Bilda will have been captured by D.3. Between D.3 and D.6 (when HQ 5 Corps and a portion of 6 Armd Div become available) the assault forces will consolidate the area. On or about D.6 a force consisting of —
Headquarters 5 Corps
78 Div (less 1 Gds Bde)
1 Armd Regt Gp 6 Armd Div
Should start overland for Bone, advancing both by the coast road (with naval assistance) to secure the aerodromes at Bougie, Djibjelli and Philippeville and by the main inland road through Setif and Constantine. The distance is about 385 miles. Assuming no resistance, this force might arrive in the Bone area as early as D.12. Any serious resistance would delay this arrival by some 8 days.
b. Bone. After the assault on Bone by the Ranger Bn and a portion of the 1 Gds Bde(78 Div) and immediate follow up consisting of the remainder of 1 Gds Bde and anti-aircraft and R.A.F. and Army maintenance personnel, will land on D.2 to develop the port and aerodrome at Dozzerville and consolidate their defense. On D.9 one Regt 1 Gp of 6 Armd Div becomes available to cover the arrival and concentration of sufficient forces to overcome anticipated resistance. It must be kept in mind that any delay in starting this advance increases the chances of being forestalled in Tunisia by the Germans.
On D.20 the Headquarters, another Armd Regt Gp and certain Inf supporting arms of 6 Armd Div are landed at Bone and the force that left Algiers on D.7 should have arrived or be close at hand. The remaining portion (all the remaining wheeled vehicles, etc) of 6 Armd Div lands about D.16 at Algiers and moves overland to Bone.
c. Tunisia. The purpose of the advance into Tunisia is to forestall the Axis in securing the ports and aerodromes there and to hold them for subsequent use in building up strong land and air forces. For this, the immediate objective should be the occupation and consolidation of the area—Bizerta—Tunis –Sousse—Kairouan—Le Kef incl. This must be accomplished by D.24 and the striking forces available by D.20 around Bone will be one Armd Div (less its losses from enemy action and breakdown; these losses are estimated at one third of the armed strength) plus 78 Div.
Full examination of the “Q” problem is not yet complete, but it looks as if not more than one Armd Div, or its equivalent, can be maintained for this advance forward from Bone at this stage.
3. AIR BUILD-UP AND AIR EFFORT
Fighters only will be brought in and established on aerodromes as they become available until D.7 when 1 Sqn of medium bombers should arrive at Algiers to be followed by two more within a week. Fighters will be employed to prevent hostile bombing of our convoys and landings, and the first bombers against possible German attempts to land in Tunisia.
4. MAINTENANCE
The establishment of bases in Algiers and Bone and the movement of forces from Algiers to Bone and from Bone into Tunisia raise administrative problems which are still under study. Until this has been completed, it is not possible to forecast beyond the early stages, and even the figures for these require reexamination owing to the maintenance demands of R.A.F. just received being very much heavier than expected.
5. The above makes no allowance for French assistance in labour or for local tpt resources (M.T. and Rail). Nor does it consider the situation which would arise if French resistance is merely a token “defensed’honneur” or non-existent. In such an event all normal calculations are abandoned and everything must be done to move speedily into Tunisia. Thus: – on D.9 a small mobile force consisting of the 1 Gds Bde Gp and one Regt Gp 6 Armd Div can advance from Bone reaching Bizerta-Tunis on D. 11 (D. 13 for the tanks). This will be followed up by the 78 Div (less Gds Bde) plus one Armd Regt Gp 6 Armd Div; leaving Algiers on D.6, reaching area D. 11 (tanks not until D. 16), arriving Tunis D. 15-D. 22. Very small fast moving parties could outstrip the above, but would have no military value.
If tpt aeroplanes are available they would, of course, also be used.
But all the above depends on so many imponderables that it cannot be accepted as a basis for a firm plan.

22nd August 1942.

————————————————————————————————————–

ENCLOSURE B
ANNEX IV
TO OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION “X”
OUTLINE PLAN WESTERN TASK FORCE

Notes by the Secretaries dated 25 August 1942
1. Preparation of Plan. The preparation of the detailed plan for the Western Task Force operation will be accomplished in the United States under the immediate of the Commander of the Task Force in conjunction with the U.S. Naval Force Commander, and under the general direction of the Allied Commander in Chief. The following outline plan, covering only broad aspects of the planning, was developed through preliminary studies made in London. It is therefore subject to modification as the detailed plan is prepared.
2. Mission. The mission of the Western Task Force is initially the assault and capture of the port of ORAN, with the aerodromes adjacent thereto, subsequently an advance westward to secure the overland lines of communication and to seize the port of CASABLANCA. This is to be followed by the building up of a striking force through the ports of CASABLANCA and ORAN prepared for rapid movement into SPANISH MOROCCO to insure retention of control of the STRAITS of GIBRALTAR. The plan for invasion of SPANISH MOROCCO is to include provision for seaborne assault in the vicinity of TANGIER.
3. Date of Assault. 15th October, 1942.
4. Assault Phase ORAN
a. Tentative Initial Assault Plan. Three pre-dawn landings, as follows:
(1) GULF of ARZEU by RCT, 1 Inf. Bn. (less transportation) and 1 Armored Bn. CT.
(2) BAY DES ANDALOUSES-2 Inf. Bn. CT’s.
(3) MERSAT BOU ZEDJAR – 1 Inf. Bn. CT and Armored Bn. CT.
Approximately one Inf. Bn. CT. to make diversionary landings on both flanks of BAY DESANDALOUSES In floating reserve, one Inf. Bn. CT. and 1 Armored Bn. CT., combat loaded; and in general reserve 1 RCT, unit loaded.
b. Aggregate Assault Forces (Ground) (Approximate) (Convoy # 1 – D. 1)
4 RCT, 3 assault loaded 18,000
1 Light Armored force, assault loaded 4,000
5 Bns. A.A. 4,000
SOS 7,200
Aggregate Ground Forces 33,200
#NOTE: This convoy also includes approximately 6,200 Air Force Ground crews and services.
c. The Air and Naval Plans are outlined in Annexes No. 2, respectively.
5. Build-up Phase
a. First Follow-up Convoys. Following the assault or first convoy, will be a slow cargo convoy (Convoy #2) of approximately 35 vessels arriving approximately D. 6.
The first follow-up troop convoy (Convoy #3) will be timed so as to arrive as soon as port facilities will permit it to unload. Originally this convoy was scheduled to arrive at D. 17. However, it appears that the limited capacity of the port of ORAN will not permit unloading the preceding cargo convoy by this time, and that Convoy #3 must be scheduled to arrive at ORAN at a later, but as yet undetermined, date.
This convoy will carry the following ground troops:
Remainder Armored and Infantry
Divisions and Supporting troops 12,000
SOS 8,000
Aggregate ground troops 20,000
#NOTE: This convoy also includes approximately 8,000 Air Force ground crews and services.
b. Upon debarkation of Convoy #3, the ORAN Forces will approximately 1 Infantry Division, 1 additional Inf. RCT and 1 Armored Division. As soon as possible after arrival of this convoy the advance westward to seize overland lines of communication will be initiated.
c. Subsequent convoys.
(1) Subsequent convoys will be brought in at ORAN and at CASABLANCA as soon as the latter port has been secured or the situation permits entry at that port. The estimated ultimate U.S. Western Force to be brought into the theater will comprise 2 Armored Divisions, 5 Infantry Divisions (one Motorized) and Supporting troops and services. The estimated aggregate strength is 250,000 exclusive of replacements.
(2) The proposed ultimate disposition of the Western Force is approximately as follows:
1 Division to occupy the ORAN area;
1 Division to occupy CASABLANCA area;
1 Division to secure the overland lines of communication;
4 Division (3 on the S.W. and 1 on the S.E. border of SPANISH MOROCCO) to constitute a striking force prepared to move into
SPANISH MOROCCO, if the necessity arises.
6. Alternate plan for Invasion of SPANISH MOROCCO
Studies are in progress to determine the practicality seizing the SPANISH MOROCCO ports, coastal defenses and airdromes by sea and airborne assaults at an earlier date than is practicable under the above outline plan. The advance westward overland through FRENCH MOROCCO, capture of CASABLANCA and subsequent building up of a striking on the border of SPANISH MOROCCO is necessarily time consuming, and circumstances may require more expeditious action to insure control of the STRAITS of GIBRALTAR. Therefore, it is proposed to prepare an alternate plan for an earlier invasion of SPANISH MOROCCO if it is determined that such operation is possible.

————————————————————————————————————–

Notes by the Secretaries dated 25 August 1942
ENCLOSURE C
Copy of Letter from General Eisenhower
Addressed to
Combined Chiefs of Staff dated 23rd August 1942.

1. With reference to the Outline Plan for Operation X, which I submitted to you yesterday I consider it advisable to invite your attention to considerations that have come to light as a result of the intensive investigations that have been conducted recently under my supervision. It is possible that some of these matters may not heretofore have been noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
2. The conclusions herein presented are based largely upon opinions of and examinations made by my subordinates……
3. It is my opinion that this expedition which as now planned is believed…not sufficiently powerful to accomplish against the potential opposition in the general theater the purpose prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If we should encounter determined resistance from the French Forces there would be little hope of gaining Tunisia ahead of Axis troops which could then be built up more rapidly than our own. If the Spanish army should be employed against us in the early weeks of the operation our communications would be in great jeopardy while the instant elimination of Gibraltar as an Air and Naval base would in itself create a difficulty of the most serious kind. This means that the chances for success of the expedition at its presently estimated strength must depend more upon political attitudes and reactions in Northern Africa than upon strictly military factors. In this connection the apparent inability of the Combined Navies to provide escorts for and attack at Casablanca along with those planned inside the Mediterranean has distinctly decreased the opportunity for creating throughout North Africa the impression of overwhelming attack, so essential to producing a readiness to accept allied occupation without material resistance.
4. The most favorable situation that we can reasonably hope to find in Northern Africa is continued neutrality on the part of the Spanish and submission on the part of the French. Under these conditions the expedition assuming that initial and follow-up forces arrive as planned should succeed. Positive French assistance can scarcely be anticipated in view of the tremendous pressure that the enemy can exert in France on the friends, families and interests of the North African inhabitants. Moreover, it would appear that once French territory has been invaded by us whatever military assets remain to French in Europe will become almost instantly available to the Germans.
5. There is no need to dwell upon the inescapable costs of this expedition measured in terms of its adverse effects on other allied ventures throughout the world. However it is obvious that both Governments will necessarily regard this venture as a military obligation of first priority with the certainty that every other theater will have to be cut to the bone in order to provide the strength necessary to attain the prescribed object, This situation will persist for number of months no matter what the degree of initial success.
6. My naval advisors have expressed grave doubts as to the ability of the Combined Navies to provide the continuous escorting and covering resources that will be essential up until the moment of final victory in this region. They believe that additional losses, commitments throughout the world and increased enemy reaction, particularly by air and submarine will make the navel aspects of this operation one of increasing hazard and difficulty. Even the initial assault will not have the naval support either in carriers or in other types that it should have.
7. Finally, it must be pointed out that no matter what the initial success of the operation nor what the degree of welcome experienced from the Spanish and French forces in Africa there will always remain the threatening possibility of Axis reaction through the Iberian Peninsula. When and if sufficient Axis forces are released from the Russian theater to be available for a deliberate campaign in that direction there would appear to be little that Allies could do to escape the inevitable effects of an Axis occupation of Spain. The closing of the door in rear of a rather victorious army in North Africa is a possibility which must not be overlooked.
8. As an expression of personal opinion I believe that if the two Governments could find the Naval, Air and Ground forces with the shipping to carry out simultaneously with the attack planned inside the Mediterranean a strong assault at Casablanca the chances for success would be greatly increased. The advantages to be gained would be in reducing the hazard of either Spanish or French hostile reaction, more quickly establishing an auxiliary line of communica-tions by land, and in increasing the port capacity of the occupied zone such simultaneous attacks could not be made before 7th November at the earliest.
Ends.
————————————————————————————————

Questions 1~8
(Must be answered in Active Voice, clear & concise, so even an eighth grader would understand the answers, need to FIRST draft a sketch/map of the locations to visualize and answer the ?’s, the map along with Joint Publication 5-0 (JP 5-0) (Search GOOGLE for JP 5-0), will assist in formulating and answering some of the questions)

SITUATION

It is now early September 1942. You are a staff officer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, European Theater of Operations. As a recent graduate, your supervisor has tasked you to review the Norfolk Group’s plan and related documents (Parts 2 and 3 handed out separately). The Combined Chiefs will meet soon to be briefed on the planning thus far in order to advise President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on the status of Operation X. Your supervisor’s instructions to you are:

“I want you to review this outline plan and the associated communications (Part 2 and 3) and give me your assessment of how well Operation X, supports the M/NATO theater campaign objectives and how well Operation X includes the main elements of operational art and design. However, to do this correctly you first need to understand the M/NATO environment and situation (Part 1). Use operational design methodology thinking to understand the North African campaign and how Operation X fits in it. Do not give me a national or European strategy assessment. Answer the questions I have provided and give me some responses I can give the Combined Chiefs. Remember that Operation X is a major operation subordinate to a larger North African Theater Campaign. The Chiefs will be here in about six hours so you don’t have much time.”

Read each question carefully !
REQUIREMENTS
Section A : Theater level : the North African Campaign

(Q_1 STARTS): Operational Design and the Operational Approach is process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns.
(JP 5-0, III-I) In the context of the Mediterranean/North Africa Theater of Operations (M/NATO), using the contextual background notes and material provided in this exam in Part 2, apply operational design thinking as described in JP 5-0 chapter III to answer the following :

Concisely, in 250 words or less, describe the problem or obstacle that is preventing the Allies from changing the current M/NATO theater-level environment to their desired campaign end state. Justify your answer.

(Q_1 ENDS):
————————————————————————————————————–
(Q_2 STARTS): Centers of gravity (COGs) can be derived from an ends, ways, and means analysis if the problem’s `system’ and have associated critical factors—critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.

Based o your answer to question 1, identify the M/NATO theater/campaign-level adversary CoG and its critical factors. The matrix below is provided for your use, but you are not required to use it. Explain your answers with 250 words or less.
(5 pts for each factor category)

Adversary N. Africa theater CoG Matrix
Ends____________________________

Critical Capabilities Center of Gravity:

_________________________________________________________________________________________
Critical Requirements: Critical Vulnerabilities

__________________________________________________________________________________________
(Q_2 ENDS):
———————————————————————————————————–
(Q_3 STARTS):
Write and draw an Allied theater campaign Operational Approach. “The operational reflects understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing the commander’s visualization of a broad approach for achieving the desired end state” (JP 5-0, pg III-13). [Related doctrine: JP 5-0, Chapters III and IV] Using the contextual background notes in Part 2 and the documents in Part 3 of this exam, concisely describe in narrative and graphic form the operational approach the Allies plan to take in the M/NATO campaign to achieve the desired theater campaign end state. Base your answer on previous responses in questions 1 and 2. The narrative is limited to no more than one page. You may use Figure III-8 of JP 5-0 as one graphic example, but you do not need to constrain your thinking to that model, a map sketch, if more useful may also be used.

*Narrative. Limit is 250 words or less.

*Graphic Sketch. Attach a separate sheet of paper

(Q_3 ENDS):
————————————————————————————————————-
(Q_4 STARTS):

Section B: Major Operation: Operation X

What defines the military end state for Operation X?

a. “Complete control of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea.”

b. Establishment of firm and mutually supported lodgments in the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area on the north coast, and in the Casablanca area on the northwest coast”

c. “…..the earliest possible occupation of TUNISIA, and the establishment in FRENCH MOROCCO of a striking force which can control STRAITS of GIBRALTAR”

d. “Complete annihilation of Axis forces now opposing the British forces in the Western Desert and intensification of air and sea operations against the Axis on the European continent”

(Q_4 ENDS):
————————————————————————————————————–
(Q_5 STARTS):

Centers of Gravity (COG) are linked to objectives that achieve the military end state (4a). COGs can be derived from an ends, ways, and means analysis and have associated critical factors—critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.

What is the Allied Center of Gravity for Operation X and its critical factors? The matrix below is provided for your use, but you are not required to use it. Explain your answers in 250 words or less. (5 pts for each factor)

Operation X Allied CoG Matrix

Ends_______________________________

Critical Capabilities Center of Gravity:

__________________________________________________________________________________________

Critical Requirements: Critical Vulnerabilities

____________________________________________________________________________________________
(Q_5 ENDS):
————————————————————————————————————–

(Q_6 STARTS):

Operation X attacks the theater-level enemy COG…..

a. Directly by attacking the COG’s main body.

b. Indirectly by attacking the COG’s main body.

c. Directly by attacking the COG’s /decisive point in Tunisia.

d. Indirectly by attacking the COG’s CVs/ decisive point in Tunisia.

(Q_6 ENDS):
————————————————————————————————————–
(Q_7 STARTS):

A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Decisive point help determine how to apply friendly critical capabilities (CC) to exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities (CV) or defend friendly centers of gravity (COG/CR/CV).

List three decisive points (not necessarily objectives) you identify as important to achiev
Operation X’s military end state [question 4]. Justify these DPs, in 250 words or less, by linking
them to the CRs and CVs of the operational or theater level COGs.

(Q_7 ENDS):
————————————————————————————————————–
(Q_8 STARTS):
A culmination point is point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0).
Understanding the concept of culmination is critical to success in operational warfare. It helps operational planners determine those factors or events that could cause either an attacker or defender to fail to achieve its operational objectives (increasing the risk of its eventual defeat).

List three events which might induce Allied culmination of Operation X forces short of achieving their operational objective without being defeated. Briefly explain your selection in 250 words or less.